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Abstract
An instance of the tollbooth problem consists of an undirected network and a collection of single-
minded customers, each of which is interested in purchasing a fixed path subject to an individual
budget constraint. The objective is to assign a per-unit price to each edge in a way that maximizes
the collective revenue obtained from all customers. The revenue generated by any customer is equal
to the overall price of the edges in her desired path, when this cost falls within her budget; otherwise,
that customer will not purchase any edge.
Our main result is a deterministic algorithm for the tollbooth problem on trees whose approxi-
mation ratio is O(log m/ log log m), where m denotes the number of edges in the underlying graph.
This finding improves on the currently best performance guarantees for trees, due to Elbassioni et
al. (SAGT ’09), as well as for paths (commonly known as the highway problem), due to Balcan and
Blum (EC ’06). An additional interesting consequence is a computational separation between toll-
booth pricing on trees and the original prototype problem of single-minded unlimited supply pricing,
under a plausible hardness hypothesis due to Demaine et al. (SODA ’06).
Keywords: Pricing, approximation algorithms, tollbooth problem, highway problem, trees, balanced
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1 Introduction
An extensively-studied question in economics and operations management is that of pricing an assortment
of products in a given market, trying to maximize revenue subject to a multitude of constraints. Somewhat
informally, the inherent difficulty in such settings boils down to the obvious tension between two extremes:
low prices attract more customers, while high prices generate greater revenues per purchase. Recently,
the spotlights have been turned on computational challenges in pricing. What seems to be the driving
force behind this line of research is an immense growth in the range of sources for acquiring costumer
preferences data, which are now available as a result of the widespread use of the Internet.
The tollbooth problem. One particular computational task that has received much recent attention is the
tollbooth problem, which captures optimization-related aspects of pricing connection links in networks,
e.g., setting prices for road use in a system of toll highways. Formally, an instance of this problem consists
of an undirected graph G = (V, E) with m edges, which can be broadly interpreted as products with un-
limited supply. An additional ingredient of the input is a collection C of n single-minded customers, each
of which is interested in purchasing a fixed path subject to an individual budget constraint. Technically
speaking, the demand attributes of customer i are represented by a pair (Pi, bi), where Pi ⊆ G is the path
she wishes to buy, and bi stands for her budget, namely, the maximum price she is willing to pay for that
path. Any customer will buy a single unit of each edge in the desired path when its total cost falls within
her budget; otherwise, she leaves without buying anything. With this setting in mind, the goal is to assign
a per-unit price to each edge in a way that maximizes the overall revenue. More precisely, the objective is
to compute a pricing scheme p : E → R+ that maximizes the total revenue over all customers,
∑n
i=1 Rp(i).
Here, Rp(i) denotes the revenue obtained from customer i, which evaluates to ∑e∈Pi p(e) when this cost
does not exceed bi, or to 0, otherwise.
Previous work. Guruswami et al. [23] seem to have been the first to study the tollbooth problem. Their
main results in this context were to show that tollbooth pricing is APX-hard even when the underlying
graph is a tree, and to devise exact dynamic-programming algorithms for the single-source variant on trees
and for several other special cases. Additional hardness results were obtained by Briest and Krysta [7],
who proved that even the seemingly-manageable setting of a simple path, commonly known as the high-
way problem, is in fact weakly NP-hard. Elbassioni, Raman, Ray, and Sitters [13] extended this result by
establishing strong NP-hardness. On the positive side, however, Balcan and Blum [3] devised an O(log m)
approximation for the highway problem; this finding is incomparable with the quasi-PTAS developed by
Elbassioni, Sitters, and Zhang [14] later on. Finally, and very recently, Elbassioni et al. [13] proposed an
O(log m) approximation for arbitrary trees. To conclude, approximating the tollbooth problem on trees,
or even on simple paths, beyond the logarithmic threshold has remained an open research question.
1.1 Our results
The main result of this paper is a deterministic algorithm for the tollbooth problem on trees whose approx-
imation ratio is O(log m/ log log m), improving on the currently best performance guarantees for trees, as
well as for paths, due to Elbassioni et al. [13], and to Balcan and Blum [3], respectively. Even though
the quantitative magnitude of improvement is not that dramatic, our findings have additional interesting
contributions:
Conceptual. We identify a computational separation between tollbooth pricing on trees and the original
prototype problem of single-minded unlimited supply pricing (see Section 1.2). The latter cannot be
approximated within a factor smaller than Ω(log n), under a plausible hardness hypothesis regarding the
balanced bipartite independent set problem [12], whereas in the former the resulting factor is better by
Ω(log log n) or more. Regarding the relation between m and n, we remark that an arbitrary instance of
tollbooth pricing on trees can be reduced to one with m = O(n). The general idea is that, when the number
of edges is significantly larger than the number of customers, paths can be iteratively contracted (see, for
instance, [13, Sec. 2.2]).
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Technical. We believe that some of the algorithmic tools and analysis methods, illustrated in Sections 2
and 3, are of independent interest, and may be applicable in other settings as well. In particular, we have
already derived new approximability bounds for graph orientation problems [18] by synthesizing ideas
such as balanced decompositions, segment guessing, and randomization.
1.2 Related work
We proceed with a brief discussion on the single-minded unlimited supply pricing problem, from which
the computational setting considered in this paper seems to have emerged. The input to the former prob-
lem consists of m different products, with unlimited supply, and a collection of n single-minded customers,
each of which is interested in purchasing a particular subset (or bundle) of products subject to an individ-
ual budget constraint. The goal is to assign a per-unit price to each product in a way that maximizes the
overall revenue, where again, a customer will buy a single unit of each product in her bundle only when
its total cost fits within her budget. This problem was originally introduced by Guruswami et al. [23],
who demonstrated that the single-price policy, where all products are given identical prices, guarantees
an approximation ratio of O(log n + log m) with respect to the optimal revenue. Later on, Balcan, Blum
and Mansour [4] extended this finding to the setting of customers with general valuation functions. From
a hardness point of view, Demaine, Feige, Hajiaghayi, and Salavatipour [12] established several inap-
proximability results under various complexity assumptions. In particular, they proved a lower bound of
Ω(log n), under a plausible hardness hypothesis regarding the balanced bipartite independent set problem.
A concurrent line of research focused on computing approximate pricing schemes in terms of other
problem parameters. For instance, when the number of different products is fixed, Hartline and Koltun [24]
showed that an FPTAS can be devised. Briest and Krysta [7] suggested an O(log B+ log ℓ) approximation,
where B is the maximum number of requests per product and ℓ is the maximum size of any bundle, as well
as a different algorithm, whose performance guarantee is O(ℓ2). Balcan and Blum [3] improved on this
result, to obtain a ratio of O(ℓ), and demonstrated that the vertex pricing problem (where ℓ = 2) can be
approximated within a factor of 4. Vertex pricing was further studied in [27, 26]. Recently, Cheung and
Swamy [11] design an LP-based algorithm for a more general model of revenue maximization in a limited
supply scenario that implies an O(log B) approximation for single-minded unlimited supply pricing.
We note that revenue maximization, in various colors and flavors, has received a great deal of recent
attention in the computer science and operations research communities. Therefore, it is beyond the scope
of this writing to do justice and present an exhaustive survey of previous work. We refer the reader to
directly related papers [19, 16, 1, 5, 8, 9, 21, 6, 10, 22] and to the references therein for a more compre-
hensive review of the literature.
2 The Classification Process
Prior to describing the specifics of our approach in detail, which will inevitably involve delving into tech-
nicalities, it would be instructive to concentrate on the bigger picture. For this purpose, we begin by
pointing out that the performance guarantee of O(log m/ log log m) is obtained by employing the classify-
and-select paradigm. More specifically, we exploit various structural properties to partition the collection
of customers into O(log m/ log log m) pairwise-disjoint classes. For each such class, given the additional
structure imposed, we separately compute a pricing scheme whose overall revenue comes within a con-
stant factor of the optimal revenue attainable from this class. In particular, each class is treated in a
completely independent fashion, as if there are no other classes under consideration. Consequently, since
the objective function is subadditive, the above-mentioned approximation ratio follows by picking, out of
the set of all pricing schemes computed, the one that collects maximal revenue. We proceed by describing
the customer classification process; this exposition will allow us to focus attention on the more involved
single-class problem later on.
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2.1 Classifying customers via balanced decompositions
In the following, we give a formal account of the process by which customers are partitioned into classes.
To this end, we begin by introducing the notion of an almost-balanced decomposition, which can be
viewed as a generalization of the well-known centroid decomposition [17]. It is worth noting that struc-
tural properties in this spirit have been explored and exploited in various settings (see, e.g., [15, 20, 25]).
Definition 2.1. Let T = (V, E) be a tree. An almost balanced k-decomposition of T is a partition of T into
k edge-disjoint subtrees T1, . . . , Tk such that each subtree contains between |E|/(3k) and 3|E|/k edges.
For ease of presentation, we defer the proof of the following lemma to Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2.2. Let T = (V, E) be a tree with |E| ≥ k. An almost balanced k-decomposition of T exists and
can be found in polynomial time. Moreover, the number of vertices that are shared by at least two subtrees
is less than k.
The classification process corresponds to a recursive decomposition of the input tree T ; to better
understand the upcoming discussion, we advise the reader to consult Figure 1. Let T1 = {T1, . . . , Tk}
be an almost balanced k-decomposition of T into k edge-disjoint subtrees. The first class of customers,
C1, consists of all customers separated by T1, that is, customers i for which the endpoints of the desired
path Pi (henceforth, si and ti) reside in different subtrees of the decomposition T1. Now, to classify the
remaining set of customers, C \C1, we recursively apply the previously-described procedure with respect
to the collection of subtrees in T1. Specifically, in the second level of the recursion, an almost balanced
k-decomposition is computed in each of the subtrees T1, . . . , Tk, to obtain a set T2, comprising of k2
subtrees. The second class of customers, C2, consists of all yet-unclassified customers separated by T2.
In other words, the endpoints of each path Pi, for which i ∈ C2, reside in different subtrees of T2, but in
the same subtree of T1. The remaining classes C3,C4, . . . are defined similarly. It is important to note that
the recursive process ends as soon as we arrive at a subtree with strictly less than k edges. In this case, we
make use of the trivial decomposition, where the given subtree is broken into individual edges.
s3s1
t2
t3
s5
s2
t4 s4
t5
t1
Figure 1: A schematic example for the collection of customers separated by an almost balanced decom-
position, where each triangle marks a single subtree. Here, customers 1, 2, and 3 are separated, whereas 4
and 5 are not.
It is quite obvious that, up until this point in time, k was treated as a parameter whose value has
not been determined yet. For our purposes, we employ the above-mentioned classification process with
k = ⌈log1/2 m⌉. With this value of k at hand1, one can easily verify that the overall number of levels in
1A careful inspection later on shows that this particular selection is rather arbitrary, and any fixed exponent smaller than 1
will do the trick.
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the recursion, or equivalently, the number of customer classes is O(logk m) = O(log m/ log log m). This
claim is immediately implied by observing that the maximum size of a subtree in level ℓ of the recursion
is at most (3/k)ℓ · |E|. As a side note, we remark that the balanced decomposition property, ensuring that
all subtrees are of size roughly |E|/k, does not play any role from this point on, as its sole purpose was to
restrict the number of classes to O(log m/ log log m).
2.2 Why handling a single decomposition is sufficient
We remind the reader that a class of customers, say Cℓ, generally consists of several subsets of customers,
each created when different subtrees in Tℓ−1 are partitioned by the decomposition Tℓ. More specifically,
assuming that the subtrees in Tℓ−1 are T1, T2, . . ., the class Cℓ can be written as the disjoint union of
C1
ℓ
,C2
ℓ
, . . ., where C j
ℓ
is the set of customers that are first separated when T j is partitioned. Notice that the
desired path of any customer separated by some subtree decomposition must be contained in that subtree,
since otherwise, this customer would have been separated in previous recursion steps. This observation
implies that it is sufficient to compute an approximate pricing scheme for a single subtree decomposition
and its induced set of separated customers. Given a polynomial-time algorithm that computes such pricing
schemes, one can sequentially apply it to each of the subtree decompositions in the same recursion level.
The resulting pricing schemes (in edge-disjoint subtrees) can then be “glued” to form a single scheme,
defined for the entire edge set, collecting at least as much revenue as the sum of all individual subtree
revenues.
3 The Single Decomposition Algorithm
In what follows, we focus our attention on a single decomposition, and devise a randomized algorithm
that computes a pricing scheme whose expected revenue is within a constant factor of the optimal revenue
attainable for this decomposition. Later on, we will argue that this algorithm can be easily derandomized.
Formally, an instance of the problem in question consists of a tree T = (V, E), and a partition T =
{T1, . . . , Tk} of this tree into k edge-disjoint subtrees, where k ≤ ⌈log1/2 m⌉, such that the number of
vertices shared by at least two subtrees is less than k. In addition, we are given a collection C of n
customers, satisfying the following properties:
1. Each customer i wishes to purchase a path Pi so long as the overall price of this path does not exceed
the budget bi.
2. Each customer path Pi is separated by T , meaning that the endpoints of Pi reside in different
subtrees of the decomposition T .
3.1 Notation and Terminology
For ease of presentation, it would be convenient to introduce some notation and terminology before laying
down the nuts and bolts of our algorithm. To better understand the suggested notation, we refer the reader
to a concrete example in Figure 2.
• Let VB ⊆ V be the set of border vertices of T , that is, the set of vertices that are shared by at
least two subtrees in T . In addition, let S ⊆ T be the skeleton of T , namely, the minimal subtree
spanned by all border vertices. Note that this subtree consists of the union of paths connecting any
two vertices in VB.
• Let p∗ : E → R+ be an optimal pricing scheme, with an overall revenue of OPT.
• Now, recall that the endpoints of each customer path Pi reside in different subtrees of the decom-
position T , meaning that Pi must traverse at least one border vertex. Therefore, we can divide each
customer path, with endpoints si and ti, into three (possibly empty) parts:
1. A subpath between si and its closest skeleton vertex vsi .
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2. A subpath between ti and its closest skeleton vertex vti .
3. A subpath between vsi and vti , along the skeleton.
Based on this definition, let RSp∗(i), RTp∗(i), and RMp∗(i) denote the revenues obtained in the pricing
scheme p∗ from the subpaths of customer i, respectively2 . Clearly, Rp∗(i) = RSp∗(i) + RTp∗(i) + RMp∗(i).
vti
vsi
si
ti
(b)(a)
T5
T6
T4T3T2T1
Figure 2: (a) An almost balanced 6-decomposition of a tree with 18 edges. Note that the black vertices
are border vertices, and the heavy edges make up the skeleton S. (b) Dividing the customer path Pi into
three parts.
3.2 The algorithm
Having all necessary definitions in place, we are now ready to present the specifics of our pricing algo-
rithm, and to analyze its performance. In the remainder of this section, we consider two complementing
scenarios, depending on the contribution of different path parts to the revenue generated by the optimal
pricing scheme p∗. Somewhat informally, the first scenario captures a situation where a significant por-
tion of OPT is gained from customer subpaths traversing non-skeleton edges, or in other words, when∑n
i=1(RSp∗(i) + RTp∗(i)) = Ω(1) · OPT. The second scenario corresponds to a situation where a large portion
is delivered by subpaths along the skeleton, that is, when ∑ni=1 RMp∗(i) = Ω(1) ·OPT. For each of these sce-
narios, we compute a pricing scheme whose expected revenue is within a constant factor of optimal. As a
result, we obtain a constant approximation ratio by computing both pricing schemes and picking the one
that achieves the maximum revenue. For sake of simplicity, we begin by considering the easy-to-handle
first scenario, noting that the second, more challenging scenario, will be discussed in the sequel.
Scenario I:∑ni=1(R
S
p∗(i) + RTp∗(i)) ≥ OPT/2
In the present setting, at least half of the optimal revenue is collected from customer subpaths consisting of
non-skeleton edges, meaning that the collective contribution of the subpaths Pi \S, over all customers i, is
at least OPT/2. The algorithmic tool that allows us to handle this scenario is a polynomial-time procedure,
due to Guruswami et al. [23], for solving the single-source tollbooth problem on trees to optimality. Here,
the underlying assumption is that all customer paths share a common endpoint, that is, s1 = · · · = sn. With
this tool at hand, the algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Each of the decomposition subtrees, T1, . . . , Tk, is randomly and independently marked as being
active, with probability 1/2; otherwise, that tree is inactive.
2. We decide in advance that all skeleton edges, as well as all edges within inactive trees, could be
purchased free of charge, i.e., their price is set to zero.
2These superscripts stand for: S – subpath adjacent to si; T – subpath adjacent to ti; and M – middle subpath.
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3. Let C(T j) denote the subset of customers with an endpoint in T j. For each active subtree T j, we
contract all skeleton edges in that subtree into a single root3, designated by r, and apply the single-
source algorithm, when the underlying set of customers are those in C(T j). Each such customer i is
now interested in purchasing the path connecting its endpoint in T j to the root r, still with a budget
of bi. Note that each customer has at most one endpoint in T j, since otherwise, T j contains her
desired path, in contradiction to the underlying setting.
Lemma 3.1. The computed pricing scheme guarantees an expected revenue of at least OPT/8.
Proof. We begin by observing that the expression
∑n
i=1(RSp∗(i) + RTp∗(i)), which stands for the overall
revenue in the optimal pricing scheme obtained from non-skeleton edges (over all customers), can be
rewritten as the sum of revenues obtained from the subtrees T1, . . . , Tk. That is, recollecting that C(T j)
denotes the subset of customers with an endpoint in T j, we have
n∑
i=1
(
RSp∗(i) + RTp∗(i)
)
=
k∑
j=1
∑
i∈C(T j)
Rp∗((Pi \ S) ∩ T j) ,
where Rp∗((Pi \ S) ∩ T j) denotes the revenue obtained from the subpath of Pi within the subtree T j,
excluding skeleton edges.
Now, for each active subtree T j, one can easily verify that the pricing scheme p∗, restricted to the
edges of T j (or, more precisely, to its skeleton-contracted version), constitutes a feasible solution to the
corresponding single-source problem, with an objective value of at least ∑i∈C(T j) Rp∗((Pi \ S)∩ T j). Since
for this particular problem we compute an optimal pricing scheme, the revenue collected from customers
in C(T j), restricted to the subtree T j, is at least that value. At this point in time, we observe that, for each
such customer, with probability 1/2 we will be able to stay within the budget bi, and collect exactly the
same profit for the entire path Pi, with additional edges outside of T j. To establish this claim, since the
price of all skeleton edges has been set to zero, it is sufficient to note that the subpath of Pi that does not
traverse edges either in the subtree T j or the skeleton S, i.e., Pi \ (T j ∪ S), is entirely contained within a
subtree different from T j; that subtree will be marked as inactive with probability 1/2, and its edge prices
will be set to zero. It follows that the expected revenue of the pricing scheme computed is at least
1
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k∑
j=1
∑
i∈C(T j)
Rp∗((Pi \ S) ∩ T j) = 14
n∑
i=1
(
RSp∗(i) + RTp∗(i)
)
≥
OPT
8 .
Scenario II: ∑ni=1 R
M
p∗
(i) ≥ OPT/2
In this setting, at least half of the optimal revenue is collected from customer subpaths consisting of
skeleton edges, meaning that the collective contribution of the subpaths Pi ∩ S, over all customers i, is at
least OPT/2. Our algorithm begins by first deciding that all non-skeleton edges could be purchased for
free, and sets their price to zero. As a result, we may assume that the endpoints of each customer path are
located on the skeleton, since otherwise, we can relocate them to their closest skeleton vertices, without
any consequences whatsoever. With this structural alteration in mind, the skeleton pricing is carried out in
two phases: segment guessing, where close estimates of the optimal prices along disjoint subpaths of the
skeleton are obtained, followed by randomized assignment, where prices are associated with individual
skeleton edges.
Phase I: segment guessing. We remind the reader that the skeleton S is the minimal subtree of T
spanned by all border vertices VB. We denote by VJ the set of junction vertices, defined as non-border
skeleton vertices with degree at least 3 (counting only skeleton edges). One can easily verify that |VJ | <
3The contraction is achieved by removing all skeleton edges, and unifying their endpoints into a representative vertex.
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|VB| < k. In addition, we call the vertex set VB ∪VJ the core of the skeleton S. Based on these definitions,
we can partition the skeleton into a collection Σ(S) of edge-disjoint paths, which are referred to as seg-
ments. Each such segment is a subpath of S whose endpoints are core vertices, but its interior traverses
only non-core vertices. Obviously, |Σ(S)| = |VB| + |VJ | − 1 < 2k.
In what follows, we argue that one could obtain in polynomial time a close estimate for the total price
p∗(σ) = ∑e∈σ p∗(e) of each segment σ ∈ Σ(S), simultaneously for all segments. To this end, it is sufficient
to prove that there exists a very small set of prices Γ, and a corresponding pricing scheme pΓ : E → R+,
such that the price given by pΓ to every segment falls within Γ, namely, pΓ(σ) ∈ Γ for each σ ∈ Σ(S), and
such that pΓ(σ) approximates p∗(σ) well. At the same time, we would like to make sure that the overall
revenue that the supporting pricing scheme pΓ collects from customer subpaths consisting of skeleton
edges still forms a fixed portion of ∑ni=1 RMp∗(i). A construction of this nature is given in the next lemma,
whose proof appears in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3.2. Let Γ = {2ℓ · bmax/(4nm) : 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊log(4nm2)⌋} ∪ {0}, where bmax = maxi bi. Then, there is
a pricing scheme pΓ : E → R+ that satisfies the following properties:
1. pΓ(σ) ∈ Γ for each σ ∈ Σ(S).
2.
∑n
i=1 R
M
pΓ(i) ≥
∑n
i=1 R
M
p∗(i)/4.
By Lemma 3.2, we conclude that to obtain a close estimate for the total price p∗(σ) of each segment
σ ∈ Σ(S), simultaneously for all segments, the total number of price assignments to be examined is of
polynomial size, since
|Γ||Σ(S)| =
(
O(log(nm)))O(k) = (O(log(nm)))O(log1/2 m) = o(nm) .
Consequently, we may assume without loss of generality that the set of segment prices {pΓ(σ) : σ ∈ Σ(S)},
given in Lemma 3.2, is known in advance. This assumption can be easily enforced by enumerating over all
o(nm) possible assignments. On the other hand, it is worth noting that we do not assume any knowledge
of the edge-specific pricing pΓ : E → R+.
Phase II: randomized assignment. The goal of this phase is to complete the pricing scheme by assign-
ing carefully-picked random prices to individual skeleton edges, based on the estimated segment prices
{pΓ(σ) : σ ∈ Σ(S)}. The crux lies in making sure that the edge-specific prices always respect the outcome
of the segment guessing phase, as stated in the next invariant.
Invariant 3.3. With probability 1, the total price of each segment σ ∈ Σ(S) is exactly pΓ(σ).
Our assignment procedure consists of independent steps, where segments are processed one after the
other. In each step, we consider a skeleton segment σ = 〈v1, . . . , vℓ〉, and assign prices to its edges
(v1, v2), . . . , (vℓ−1, vℓ) in a way that satisfies Invariant 3.3. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 3(a), we
pick one of the following four price assignments uniformly at random:
1. Assign a price of pΓ(σ) to the edge (v1, v2), and zero prices to the remaining edges.
2. Assign a price of pΓ(σ) to the edge (vℓ−1, vℓ), and zero prices to the remaining edges.
3. Assign prices based on a v1-rooted single-source problem (see description below).
4. Assign prices based on a vℓ-rooted single-source problem, analogous to item 3.
To complete the description of our algorithm, it remains to explain how the single-source instances in
items 3 and 4 are created and solved; for brevity of presentation, we focus on the v1-rooted case, noting
that the opposite case is identical, up to changing the roles of v1 and vℓ. Once again, we will employ
the dynamic-programming algorithm of Guruswami et al. [23] for solving the single-source tollbooth
problem on trees, a valuable tool that was introduced in Scenario I. In particular, the v1-rooted instance is
comprised of the following components:
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• The underlying graph is the segment σ.
• The set of customers are those with an endpoint in {v2, . . . , vℓ−1}, whose desired path exits the
segment σ through v1.
• For each customer i under consideration, we set up a new endpoint at v1 instead of the one outside
σ, and change her budget to min{pΓ(σ), bi −∑σ¯:σ¯⊆Pi pΓ(σ¯)}. Note that the latter term is exactly the
budget remaining to purchase Pi, assuming that a total price of pΓ(σ¯) has already been paid for each
segment σ¯ that is fully-contained in Pi.
Needless to say, the single-source algorithm does not set a price for the edge (vℓ−1, vℓ), as it is not contained
in any desired path of the v1-rooted instance constructed. Therefore, to ensure that Invariant 3.3 holds,
we set the price of (vℓ−1, vℓ) to be the difference between the total segment price pΓ(σ) and the total
newly-computed price of (v1, v2), . . . , (vℓ−2, vℓ−1). Here, it is important to point out that this difference is
indeed non-negative, since the dynamic-programming algorithm guarantees that the price of each subpath
〈v1, . . . , v j〉 is equal to the budget of some customer whose desired path is contained in 〈v1, . . . , v j〉 (see
[23, Thm. 5.3]); on the other hand, the budget of every customer cannot exceed pΓ(σ), by definition.
(a)
assignment 4:
assignment 3:
assignment 2:
(b)
assignment 1:
pΓ(σ)0 0 0
pΓ(σ) 0 0 0
vℓvℓ−1vℓ−2v3v2v1
vℓvℓ−1vℓ−2v3
vℓvℓ−1vℓ−2v3v2v1
customers leaving through v1
v2
v1 v2 v3 vℓ−2 vℓ−1 vℓ
customers leaving through vℓ
v1
u¯ti
ti
uti
si
usi
u¯si
Figure 3: (a) A schematic description of the four random assignments for the segment σ. Here, core
vertices are marked in black. (b) The new customer path partition.
Analysis. The remainder of this section is devoted to proving that the expected revenue of the pricing
scheme computed in the randomized assignment phase is within a constant factor of optimal, as formally
stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. The pricing scheme constructed in the randomized assignment phase guarantees an expected
revenue of at least OPT/256.
Recall that we have previously assumed the endpoints of each customer path Pi to be located on the
skeleton. Moreover, since these endpoints reside in different subtrees of the decomposition T , the path
Pi must traverse at least one border vertex. For this reason, as shown in Figure 3(b), we can divide each
customer path, with endpoints si and ti, into three (possibly empty) parts:
1. A subpath, along a partial segment, between si and its closest core vertex usi .
2. A subpath, along a partial segment, between ti and its closest core vertex uti .
3. A subpath between usi and uti , along a sequence of complete segments.
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With these definitions in mind, let R ˜SpΓ(i), R
˜T
pΓ(i), and R
˜M
pΓ(i) denote the revenues obtained in the esti-
mated pricing scheme pΓ from the subpaths of customer i, respectively. We remark that pΓ is the pricing
scheme whose existence has been established in Lemma 3.2. Note that, by item 2 of this lemma, we can
bound the sum of the above-mentioned revenues, over all customers, in terms of OPT, since
n∑
i=1
(
R ˜SpΓ(i) + R
˜T
pΓ(i) + R
˜M
pΓ(i)
)
=
n∑
i=1
RMpΓ(i) ≥
1
4
n∑
i=1
RMp∗(i) ≥
OPT
8
.
In what follows, we consider two cases, depending on the contribution of different path parts to the revenue
generated by the pricing scheme pΓ. For each of these cases, we show that the randomized assignment
phase computes a pricing scheme whose expected revenue is within a constant factor of optimal.
Case I:∑ni=1 R
˜M
pΓ(i) ≥ OPT/16. In this setting, a significant fraction of the optimal revenue is collected
from customer subpaths consisting of complete segments, meaning that the collective contribution of the
paths usi ! uti , over all customers i, is at least OPT/16. Notice that, by Invariant 3.3, our pricing scheme
always assigns a total price of pΓ(σ) to each segment σ ∈ Σ(S), implying that the overall price of usi ! uti
is exactly R ˜MpΓ(i). Therefore, the revenue from customer i is at least R
˜M
pΓ(i), unless the total price of the
remaining partial segments si ! usi and ti ! uti exceeds the residual budget, bi − R
˜M
pΓ(i). We next
argue that, with probability at least 1/16, all edges on these partial segments will be given zero prices.
Consequently, the expected revenue from customer i is at least R ˜MpΓ(i)/16, and by linearity of expectation,
the overall expected revenue is no less than ∑ni=1 R
˜M
pΓ(i)/16 ≥ OPT/256.
For the purpose of establishing the previously mentioned claim, we will show that, with probability at
least 1/4, each and every edge on si ! usi is assigned a zero price. The claim then follows by observing
that an identical property with respect to ti ! uti can be proven along the same lines, and also, that the
two events are independent. Now, notice that if si is a core vertex then the claim trivially holds, since
si ! usi is empty. Hence, let us consider the case where si is an internal vertex on the segment between
the core vertices usi and u¯si . In this case, with probability 1/4, our algorithm assigns a price of zero to all
edges in this segment, except for the edge adjacent to u¯si ; in particular, all edges on si ! usi are assigned
zero prices.
Case II:∑ni=1(R
˜S
pΓ(i) + R
˜T
pΓ(i)) ≥ OPT/16. Here, a constant fraction of the optimal revenue is collected
from customer subpaths consisting of partial segments, meaning that the collective contribution of the
paths si ! usi and ti ! uti , over all customers i, is at least OPT/16. Consider some segment σ =
〈v1, . . . , vℓ〉, and let C(σ) denote the collection of customers that have one of their path endpoints in
{v2, . . . , vℓ−1}. Clearly, if we use RσpΓ(i) to denote the revenue obtained in the pricing scheme pΓ from
customer i along the segment σ, then
∑
σ∈Σ(S)
∑
i∈C(σ)
RσpΓ(i) =
n∑
i=1
(
R ˜SpΓ(i) + R
˜T
pΓ(i)
)
.
Furthermore, let CL(σ) and CR(σ) be the sets of customers in C(σ) whose desired path exits the segment
σ through v1 and vℓ, respectively. Obviously, C(σ) = CL(σ) ∪ CR(σ).
Recall that, with probability 1/4, our algorithm computes an optimal pricing scheme pL for a v1-rooted
single-source problem on the segment σ. In particular, it is not difficult to verify that the underlying set
of customers would be CL(σ), with paths restricted to the segment σ, and moreover, that each customer i
will be associated with a newly-defined budget of min{pΓ(σ), bi −∑σ¯:σ¯⊆Pi pΓ(σ¯)}. Notice that the pricing
scheme pΓ forms a feasible solution to this instance, implying that if RσpL (i) denotes the overall revenue
from customer i along the segment σ with respect to pL, we have
∑
i∈CL(σ)
RσpL(i) ≥
∑
i∈CL (σ):
si∈σ
R ˜SpΓ(i) +
∑
i∈CL (σ):
ti∈σ
R ˜TpΓ(i) .
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Similarly, with probability 1/4, we compute an optimal pricing scheme pR for a vℓ-rooted single-source
problem, and using almost identical arguments, obtain the inequality
∑
i∈CR(σ)
RσpR(i) ≥
∑
i∈CR (σ):
si∈σ
R ˜SpΓ(i) +
∑
i∈CR (σ):
ti∈σ
R ˜TpΓ(i) .
We proceed by showing that for every productive customer i ∈ C(σ), with probability at least 1/4, the
total price that will be assigned to the path Pi, excluding edges residing within the segment σ, is exactly∑
σ¯:σ¯⊆Pi pΓ(σ¯). In this case, the (global) budget bi is not exceeded, since customer i was given a budget
of no more than bi −
∑
σ¯:σ¯⊆Pi pΓ(σ¯) in the single-source problem on σ. Prior to proving this claim, we
remark that it is indeed sufficient to conclude Case II, since the overall expected revenue would be at least
1
16
∑
σ∈Σ(S)

∑
i∈CL(σ)
RσpL(i) +
∑
i∈CR(σ)
RσpR(i)

≥
1
16
∑
σ∈Σ(S)

∑
i∈CL (σ):
si∈σ
R ˜SpΓ(i) +
∑
i∈CL (σ):
ti∈σ
R ˜TpΓ(i) +
∑
i∈CR(σ):
si∈σ
R ˜SpΓ(i) +
∑
i∈CR (σ):
ti∈σ
R ˜TpΓ(i)

=
1
16
∑
σ∈Σ(S)
∑
i∈C(σ)
(
R ˜SpΓ(i) + R
˜T
pΓ(i)
)
=
1
16
n∑
i=1
(
R ˜SpΓ(i) + R
˜T
pΓ(i)
)
≥
OPT
256 .
To prove the last claim, consider some particular customer i ∈ C(σ), and without loss of generality,
suppose that the endpoint of Pi that resides within the segment σ is si. We therefore focus on bounding the
total price of the subpath connecting usi and ti, which can be broken into two probabilistically-independent
parts:
• A subpath between usi and uti , along a sequence of complete segments. By Invariant 3.3, with
probability 1, the total price of each complete segment σ¯ is pΓ(σ¯), immediately implying that the
total price of usi ! uti is
∑
σ¯:σ¯⊆Pi pΓ(σ¯).
• A subpath, along a partial segment (different from σ), between ti and uti . Here, with probability at
least 1/4, each and every edge on ti ! uti is assigned a zero price. The arguments for proving this
case are identical to those in Case I, and we do not repeat them to avoid duplicity.
3.3 Derandomization
The avid reader may already have noticed that the extent to which we utilize randomization is rather
limited, and that its foremost purpose is to make the presentation of our algorithm significantly simpler.
More specifically, in Scenario I each subtree in the decomposition is randomly marked as being active
or inactive, whereas in Scenario II one of four possible price assignments is picked at random for each
segment. In other words, all we need to obtain a deterministic algorithm are two uniform sample spaces,
with O(1) possible values for O(log1/2 m) random variables. These can be constructed in polynomial
time either explicitly, as there are only O(mO(1)) outcomes to examine, or in a more compact way, by
observing that nothing more than pairwise-independence (see, for instance, [2, Chap. 15]) is required for
the preceding analysis.
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A Additional Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2
We begin by presenting a well-known result regarding centroid decompositions in trees.
Definition A.1. Let T = (V, E) be a tree. A centroid decomposition of T is a partition of T into two edge-
disjoint subtrees (sharing a common vertex) such that each subtree contains between |E|/3 and 2|E|/3
edges.
Theorem A.2. ([17]) Let T = (V, E) be a tree with |E| ≥ 2. A centroid decomposition of T exists and can
be found in linear time.
We now propose an iterative process for generating an almost balanced k-decomposition of T in
polynomial time. This process consists of k − 1 steps, where in each step a centroid decomposition is
applied to a subtree having maximal number of edges. That is, in the first step, a centroid decomposition
is applied to T and results in subtrees T1 and T2; in the second step, a centroid decomposition is applied
to the subtree with maximal number of edges (out of T1 and T2); so forth and so on. Clearly, this process
can be implemented to run in polynomial time, as implied by Theorem A.2.
We argue that the collection of k subtrees resulting from this process is indeed an almost balanced
k-decomposition, noting in advance that the number of vertices shared by at least two subtrees is less than
k. For this purpose, we are left to prove that each subtree contains between |E|/(3k) and 3|E|/k edges. We
next claim that in each step, the number of edges in the maximal subtree, i.e., the subtree that has maximal
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number of edges, is no more than 3 times greater than the number of edges in the minimal subtree, i.e.,
the subtree with minimal number of edges. This claim implies that, at the end of the process, each subtree
must have at least |E|/(3k) edges. Otherwise, it follows that all k subtrees must have less than |E|/k edges,
and thus, the decomposition consists of less than |E| edges. By employing similar arguments, one can
show that each subtree has no more than 3|E|/k edges.
We turn to prove the above-mentioned claim by induction on the number of steps performed. At
the beginning of the process, the claim trivially holds. Now, suppose the claim holds at the beginning
of some step. Namely, the maximal subtree has rmax edges, the minimal subtree has rmin edges, and
rmax/rmin ≤ 3. Recall that the centroid decomposition partitions a subtree with maximal number of edges
into two subtrees that contain between rmax/3 and 2rmax/3 edges. This implies that at the beginning of
the following step, the maximal subtree has no more than rmax edges, while the minimal subtree has at
least min{rmin, rmax/3} edges. Notice that in either case, the size ratio between the maximal and minimal
subtrees is at most 3.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
The general idea behind our proof is to perform a sequence of modifications to the optimal pricing scheme
p∗, trying to arrive at a new scheme pΓ that satisfies the required properties. For this purpose, we begin
by observing that, without loss of generality, p∗(e) ≤ bmax for every edge e ∈ E; otherwise, by setting
p∗(e) = bmax, the overall revenue may only improve. We now separately consider each segment σ ∈ Σ(S),
and proceed as follows:
1. If p∗(σ) < bmax/(4nm), we set the price of every edge in σ to zero.
2. If bmax/(4nm) ≤ p∗(σ) ≤ mbmax, we uniformly scale down the prices of all edges in σ such that the
newly-defined price of σ will be equal to the maximal value γ ∈ Γ such that γ ≤ p∗(σ). For this
purpose, the scaling factor is simply γ/p∗(σ) ≥ 1/2, where the last inequality holds since Γ consists
of a geometric sequence between bmax/(4nm) and mbmax, with a multiplier of 2.
This construction clearly satisfies the first property, and it remains to prove
∑n
i=1 R
M
pΓ(i) ≥
∑n
i=1 R
M
p∗(i)/4.
To validate the last inequality, note that our modifications may lead to two types of revenue losses: additive
(due to item 1) and multiplicative (due to item 2). The additive loss can be easily bounded by observing
that each edge appears at most once on any customer path and that the skeleton consists of at most m
edges. Therefore, the entire contribution of edges that were modified in the first item can be bounded by
nm ·
bmax
4nm
=
bmax
4
≤
OPT
4
≤
1
2
n∑
i=1
RMp∗(i) ,
where the first inequality holds since OPT ≥ bmax, as an overall revenue of bmax can obviously be attained.
In addition, the multiplicative loss can be bounded by noting that the scaling factor in the second item is
at least 1/2. It follows that ∑ni=1 RMpΓ(i) ≥
∑n
i=1 R
M
p∗(i)/4.
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